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WHY ILLINOIS SHOULD ABANDON FRYE'S GENERAL




Since the end of World War I, Americans literally have been to
the moon and back. The Great Depression, the Civil Rights move-
ment, and Watson & Crick have all had an impact on what we know
and how we go about our lives. Our judiciary has not been immune
to these changes. Seminal cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,' Brown v. Board of Education,2 and Griswold v. Con-
necticut are all examples of societal influences persuading the High
Court in the last seventy years. This demonstrates a perpetual
seesaw, where our nation evolves due to both social and scientific
influences and the courts follow suit. At times, however, the judiciary
lags far behind the advances made in the laboratory.
In the 1923 case Frye v. United States, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia established what would long remain the
dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scien-
* J.D. with honors, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2002.
I would like to thank the Honorable Kenneth L. Gillis and Professor Richard S. Kling for their
insight and valuable criticism and William Borders, Ehab Samuel, and Kathryn Woodward for
their careful editing and constructive comments.
1. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). This was the major case testing the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, one of President Roosevelt's New Deal plans. The Court had
come under scrutiny from the President for several years for consistently rejecting New Deal
regulations as unconstitutional. The President had recommended a "court packing plan," which
was eventually rejected by Congress, but not before one Justice retired and the Court seemingly
changed its direction in several decisions regarding regulatory statutes. See also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES ch. 3 § 3.3.4 (2d ed. 2002),
for further comments and cases on subject.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Arguably the most important Supreme Court decision ever
handed down, Brown gave life and legal support to the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court recognized a zone of privacy arising from the
"penumbra" of the First Amendment, which was a basis for the decision in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
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tific evidence at trial.4 In an opinion without a single citation, the
court held that to be admissible at trial, an expert's testimony "must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance" in the
relevant scientific community.5 This so-called Frye general accep-
tance standard stood as the dominant standard for the admission of
scientific evidence in state and federal jurisdictions for nearly seventy
years. The United States Supreme Court sounded the demise of Frye
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.,6 a 1993 decision
holding that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence sup-
planted the Frye standard. To date, thirty-four jurisdictions have
rejected, 7 three have modified,8 and fourteen still utilize the Frye
standard. 9 Illinois remains in the minority, retaining the outdated
general acceptance standard.10
This Note examines the standard for the admission of novel sci-
entific evidence at trial in Illinois. It traces the nationwide emer-
gence, dominance, and current departure from Frye's general
acceptance standard due to the inherent problems and ambiguities
involved in Frye's application, and the problematic results that arise
from using Frye. This Note then focuses on the conflict between Frye
and Daubert, and Daubert's impact on the continued application of
Frye in Illinois. As the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet addressed
this conflict, this Note examines Daubert's impact, in part through an
assessment of several jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
Part I of this Note traces the evolution of the standard for admis-
sion of novel scientific evidence over the past seven decades.11 It
outlines the transformation from Frye to Daubert. Part II discusses
the Frye hydra, identifying the jurisdictions that adhere to Frye, those
that utilize a modification of Frye's general acceptance standard, and
those that have rejected Frye in favor of another approach."2 Part III
of this Note traces the Illinois approach to the admission of novel
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see infra notes 22-31 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. See infra notes 107-25 and accompanying text, tbls. 1, 3, 4.
8. See infra notes 95-106 and accompanying text, tbls. 1, 3, 4.
9. See infra notes 78-94 and accompanying text, tbls. 1, 3, 4.
10. See Donaldson v. Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 323 (Ill. 2002) ("Illinois law
is unequivocal: the exclusive test for the admission of expert testimony is governed by the
standard first expressed in Frye v. United States.").
11. See infra notes 16-69 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 70-125 and accompanying text.
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scientific evidence, including the Illinois Supreme Court's recent
rejection of the Fourth District Appellate Court's "Frye plus reliabil-
ity" standard. 13 Part IV discusses the arguments supporting and
denouncing both Frye and Daubert.14 Part IV also asserts that Frye
has run its course, outliving its usefulness in our high-speed, techno-
logically advanced nation. This Note then concludes that in order to
protect the jury's fact-finding role, Illinois should abandon the
outdated general acceptance standard in favor of either the more
flexible approach of Daubert or at least a Federal Rule of Evidence
("FRE") 702-based approach. Finally, this Note provides an appen-
dix containing several tables that summarize where all fifty states and
the federal courts stand on the issues raised in this Note.
15
I. FRYE TO DAUBERT: EVOLUTION OF THE ADMISSION OF NOVEL
SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The primary function of a trial is to determine the truth. To per-
form this function properly the trier of fact must receive relevant,
reliable evidence. In order to be relevant, evidence must have
probative force. In other words, the evidence must tend to make the
existence of a determinative fact more probable or less probable than
it is without the evidence. On the other hand, courts gauge reliability
in relation to the form of the evidence presented. They evaluate the
reliability of a statement according to the hearsay rules, 6 while
evaluating scientific principals and theories based on their degree of
originality. 7 Well-established scientific principals and theories are
worthy of judicial or legislative notice.18  For example, in Illinois,
forensic use of restriction fragment length polymorphism analysis
13. See infra notes 126-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 172-225 and accompanying text.
15. See infra tbls. 1-4.
16. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801-07.
17. There is an important distinction in the difference between the relevance of a scientific
technique or procedure and its reliability. The relevance of a particular scientific technique is
subject to variance depending on the facts of a particular case. It would be inappropriate to
determine the reliability of a scientific technique in the same manner. Considerations of
uniformity and consistency dictate the need for a legal standard to judge the reliability of a
scientific technique or procedure.
18. The Maryland Supreme Court noted this, asserting:
On occasion, the validity and reliability of a scientific technique may be so broadly and
generally accepted in the scientific community that a trial court may take judicial no-
tice of its reliability. Such is commonly the case today with regard to ballistics tests,
fingerprint identification, blood tests, and the like.
Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (Md. Ct. App. 1978) (citation omitted).
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(hereinafter, "RFLP") (a type of DNA testing) is so well established
that trial courts may take judicial notice of its reliability, thereby
relieving the proponent of RFLP evidence the burden of establishing
its admissibility.19 Novel scientific principals and theories, however,
are not subject to such notice. Therefore, courts have established
certain standards to ensure the reliability of novel scientific evi-
dence.20 The importance of these standards cannot be understated,
for as the California Supreme Court emphasized, "[l]ay jurors tend to
give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented by
'experts' with impressive credentials."'" The evolution of an appro-
priate standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence began in
1923, with the unassuming decision of Frye v. United States.
A. Frye v. United States: General Acceptance in the Relevant
Scientific Community
In Frye v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia considered the admissibility of evidence derived from a
systolic blood pressure test.2  With neither explanation nor cited
authority, the court proclaimed:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it belongs.23
Based on its newly pronounced "general acceptance" standard, the
court held the systolic blood pressure test had "not yet gained such
19. See People v. Hickey, 687 N.E.2d 910, 920-21 (I11. 1997) (holding that a Frye hearing to
determine the admissibility of the forensic use of RFLP analysis was not needed due to the
court's prior ruling of its admissibility).
20. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 1-
5, 1-6, 1-7 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the three major approaches to the admission of novel
scientific testimony: Frye, the relevancy approach, and Daubert).
21. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976).
22. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The device used in Frye was a
crude forerunner of the polygraph machine, "more accurately described as a monograph, since,
unlike the modern polygraph, it measured only one physiological response-blood pressure."
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-
Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1204 n.41 (1980).
23. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psycho-
logical authorities as would justify the courts in admitting [it]."
'24
Frye imposes a significant burden for the admission of novel sci-
entific evidence: general acceptance by the relevant scientific com-
munity.25  The general acceptance standard requires a two-step
analysis. First, the court must identify the scientific community in
which the underlying principle falls.26 Second, it must be determined
whether members of the identified scientific community have gener-
ally accepted the principle.
27
Initially, Frye's general acceptance standard received little rec-
ognition.28 As the introduction of novel scientific techniques in-
creased, however, judges cited Frye as leading authority.2 9 The rush
by State courts to adopt Frye mirrored the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
one unfortunate respect, it was devoid of supporting justification.
30
Eventually, the Frye standard gained general acceptance itself and




25. The process whereas a novel technique gains general acceptance has been described as
"an evolutionary process." A novel technique passes through an "experimental" stage, where it
is subject to scrutiny by the relevant scientific community, to a "demonstrable" stage, where
successful testing allows for judicial recognition. Giannelli, supra note 22, at 1205.
26. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. Ct. App. 1978).
The identity of the relevant scientific community is, of course, a matter which depends
upon the particular technique in question. In general, members of the relevant scien-
tific community will include those whose scientific background and training are suffi-
cient to allow them to comprehend and understand the process and form a judgment
about it.
Id.
27. What exactly constitutes general acceptance has never been clearly defined. See infra
text accompanying notes 188-91.
28. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General
Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICs 385, 388 (2001).
29. Giannelli, supra note 22, at 1204.
30. Id. at 1206 (adding that judicial adoption without a supporting rationale was especially
true of the early cases to adopt Frye); see also infra notes 128-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the lack of supporting rationale present throughout Illinois' treatment of Frye).
31. See Giannelli, supra note 22, at 1205 (writing in 1980 that "the Frye test has dominated
the admissibility of scientific evidence for more than half a century"); see also Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993) (since its formation "general acceptance"
has been the dominant test for determining admissibility of scientific evidence at trial); Reed,
391 A.2d at 368 (general acceptance has become the standard in almost all the courts in the
country that have considered the issue); GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 20, § 1-5, at
11.
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B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow: The Reliability Approach
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court displaced Frye with the land-
mark decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
32
Daubert involved the admissibility of expert testimony linking the use
of Bendectin, an antinausea drug, with birth defects.33 The Court held
that the Federal Rules of Evidence34 displaced Frye's general accep-
tance standard.3" In so ruling, the Court noted "a rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of
the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the tradi-
tional barriers to "opinion" testimony.' 3 6 As for the new standard,
the Court held that the rules themselves were to guide the courts,
with judges acting as "gatekeepers" 37 protecting the jury from "junk
science. ' 38 As gatekeeper, the trial judge has the task of ensuring that
32. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split concerning
the standard for admission of scientific evidence in federal courts. Id. at 585.
33. Id. at 582-85. The case involved a summary judgment battle based on conflicting
expert witness affidavits. The defense claimed that there was no link between ingestion of
Bendectin and birth defects, as was shown through the review of more than twenty published
studies involving over 130,000 patients. The plaintiffs countered with numerous experts of their
own, all claiming a link between the drug and birth defects; however, their claims were
supported by clinical studies and "reanalysis" of previously published studies. Id.
34. Specifically, the Court held that FRE 702, entitled "Testimony by Experts," spoke to
the contested issue, noting that nothing in the text of FRE 702 "establishes 'general acceptance'
as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility." Id. at 588. When Daubert was decided in 1993 the
Rule provided, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702 (1972), reprinted in PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW EVIDENCE RULES 94 (1973). The Rule was amended in 2000 in
response to Daubert to include, after "otherwise," "if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case." FED. R. EVID.
702.
35. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. "Nothing in the text of this Rule [702] establishes 'general
acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear
indication that FRE 702 or the rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a 'general
acceptance' standard." Id. at 588.
36. Id. (internal citations omitted).
37. Id. The Court introduced the "gatekeeping" responsibility of a trial judge by stating:
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however,
that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific
evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the con-
trary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony
or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
Id. at 589.
38. While an exact definition of "junk science" cannot easily be found, it seems to embody
unproven, and perhaps even frivolous, theories or techniques that could unduly influence the
jury. Junk science may look, smell, and taste like reliable science, but it is not.
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an expert's testimony is both relevant and reliable."9 To perform this
task, the trial judge must determine at the outset whether, pursuant to
FRE 104(a), 40 "the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific
knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or deter-
mine a fact in issue. '41 Thus, the trial judge must resolve whether the
proffered scientific evidence satisfies the requirements of FRE 702.
Accordingly, in order to enable a trial judge to make the preliminary
FRE 702 inquiry, the Court offered workable definitions of "scien-
tific" and "knowledge. ' '42 The Court defined scientific as implying "a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science. '43 Knowledge,
the Court held, "connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. The term 'applies to any body of known facts or to any
body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds."'" Therefore, as the Court declared, "the requirement that
an expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability. '45  At this point, the Court could
have stopped and relied on trial judges to exercise their gatekeeping
duties simply with FRE 702's language, and the Court's recent
definitions, as a guide. 46 The Court, however, did not.
First, the Court expressed confidence in the ability of federal
judges to make the initial FRE 702 determination. 47 Then, the Court
bestowed some "general observations" to help guide a trial court in
39. Id.
40. FRE 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
41. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The second consideration, that the evidence or testimony
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" is a factor of
relevance similar to other issues of relevance a trial judge deals with on a daily basis. See id. at
591 (discussing FRE 702's requirement that the evidence or testimony assist the trier of fact).
42. The Court noted that FRE 702 also applies to "technical, or other specialized
knowledge," but limited its discussion to scientific knowledge. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8. But
see infra text accompanying notes 65-69. (applying Daubert to the admission of technical
evidence).
43. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
44. Id. (citation omitted). The Court added that it would be unreasonable to require the
subject of an expert's testimony be known to a certainty, for there are arguably no certainties in
science. Id.
45. Id.; see also infra note 121.
46. This is the position that Chief Justice Rehnquist took in dissent. Daubert, 509 U.S. at
598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 593.
20031
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
its ultimate determination of evidentiary reliability. 48  The Court
began by stating that unlike the general acceptance standard, no one
factor should control the admission of evidence; rather, several
factors serve as a flexible guide 9.4  Additionally, in assessing the
admissibility of scientific evidence, the focus must be "solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gener-
ate."50 With this in mind, the court offered five factors for considera-
tion: (1) whether the theory or technique has been tested;5' (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and
publication;5 2 (3) whether the known or potential rate of error is
acceptable; 3 (4) whether standards exist and are maintained to
control the technique's operation; 4 and (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted. 5
The Court concluded by addressing two important issues raised
by the parties and amici. First, one raised a concern that relaxing the
standard for admission by abandoning Frye would "result in a 'free-
for-all' in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and
irrational pseudoscientific assertions. '56 The Court responded that
"[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
48. Id. at 592-95. The Court stressed that "[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and we
do not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are
appropriate." Id. at 593.
49. The Court stated that "[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible
one." This liberal approach is echoed throughout the Court's opinion. See generally id.
50. Id. at 595.
51. Id. at 593. Clearly a scientific theory or technique presented absent proper testing is
presumably unreliable. Therefore, the Court stated, "[o]rdinarily, a key question to be
answered... will be whether [the theory or technique] can be (and has been) tested." Id.
52. Id. at 593-94. The Court noted that "[p]ublication (which is one element of peer
review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability,
and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published." Id.
at 593 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id. at 594; see also GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 20, §1-7(B), at 39-41.
(explaining the Court's reasoning in light of several federal cases dealing with the factor of
"error rate").
54. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
55. Id. ("Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence
admissible, and 'a known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within
the community,' may properly be viewed with skepticism.") (internal citations omitted).
56. The Respondent, Merrell Dow, raised this concern. Id. at 595. The Respondent, as the
Court put it, was "overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary
system generally." Id. at 596.
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appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."57
Second, the Court addressed the concern that judges as gatekeepers
will "sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy and will be
inimical to the search for truth. 5 8  Although open debate is an
essential component of both the legal and scientific communities, the
Court warned "there are important differences between the quest for
truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory.
Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the
other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly."5 9 Recognizing
that a judge as gatekeeper may practically exclude authentic scientific
insights and innovations, the Court concluded that the "balance that
is struck by the Rules of Evidence [is] designed not for the exhaustive
search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution
of legal disputes."6°
C. General Electric Co. v. Joiner & Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v.
Carmichael
Daubert may have succeeded in establishing a new standard for
the admission of scientific evidence, but it left many issues unre-
solved. First, Daubert did not address the standard of review appel-
late courts should employ to evaluate evidentiary rulings.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has held that abuse of discretion is
the appropriate standard for an appellate court reviewing trial judge's
evidentiary rulings.61 However, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the
Eleventh Circuit suggested that Daubert had somehow altered this
with regard to the exclusion of scientific evidence. 62 In reviewing the
district court's exclusion of expert testimony, the circuit court applied
57. Id. The Court went on to state "conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion
under an uncompromising 'general acceptance' test, are the appropriate safeguards where the
basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702." Id.
58. The Petitioners, and amici representing the scientific community, supported this
position. Id.
59. Id. at 596-97. The Court continued, stating:
The scientific project is advanced by broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multi-
tude of hypothesis, for those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and
that in itself is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, how-
ever, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment-often of
great consequence-about a particular set of events in the past.
Id. at 597.
60. Id.
61. See Old Chief v. U.S., 519 U.S. 172,174 n.1 (1997).
62. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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"a particularly stringent standard of review. 6 3 The Supreme Court
held this application incorrect, stressing that:
[W]hile the Federal Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit
a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have
been admissible under Frye, they leave in place the "gatekeeper"
role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. A court of ap-
peals applying "abuse-of-discretion" review to such rulings may not
categorically distinguish between rulings allowing expert testimony
and rulings disallowing it... In applying an overly "stringent" re-
view to that ruling, [the court of appeals] failed to give the trial
court the deference that is the hallmark of abuse-of-discretion re-
view.64
Second, FRE 702 pertains not only to "scientific," but also to
"technical, or other specialized knowledge," 65 while Daubert address
only scientific knowledge. The Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co.,
Ltd. v. Carmichae166 addressed this gap. In Kumho, the Court held
that Daubert's gatekeeping function applies not only to "scientific"
testimony, but to all other expert testimony as well.67 FRE 702 grants
all expert witnesses, technical as well as scientific, the opportunity to
testify as long as that expert's testimony has a reliable basis grounded
in the knowledge of their discipline.68 The Court further stated that a
trial judge determining the admissibility of a technical witness's
testimony may use the Daubert criteria as a guide, but need not rely
on them.69
II. THE FRYE HYDRA: USE, MODIFICATION, OR REJECTION
AMONG THE STATES
The Daubert trilogy 70 establishes a common approach to the ad-
mission of novel scientific evidence in the federal courts. By doing so,
it fulfills two important tasks: it preserves the jury's fact-finding role
and provides the uniformity required of a reliability-evaluating
63. Id. at 529.
64. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142-43.
65. FED R. EVID. 702; see also supra note 34.
66. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
67. Kumho Tire Co, Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
68. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
69. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141-42. (stating that the Daubert test is "flexible," its factors
neither necessarily nor exclusively apply to every expert in every case, and the law grants the
district court broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony under FRE
702).
70. Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire are routinely referred to as the Daubert trilogy.
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standard. 7' This Note, however, is not specifically concerned with
novel scientific evidence in the federal system, or even its admission
in trial courts of other states. Rather, this Note focuses on the proper
standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence in Illinois.
However, to categorize jurisdictional approaches outside of Illinois as
unimportant would be a mistake. The rule-based Daubert standard,
and the reaction of other states to Daubert, can serve as a guide to
Illinois. This is especially true in light of two factors. First, the
present standard utilized by Illinois courts, the Frye standard,
emerged long before the scientific developments of today were
imaginable. Second, despite the criticism of Frye and its displacement
in the federal courts and the majority of other states that have aban-
doned it, the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to address Frye's
continued legitimacy.7 2 Therefore, in order to evaluate properly
whether Frye should remain the standard for admission of novel
scientific evidence in Illinois, it is appropriate to consider the stan-
dards employed by other jurisdictions in light of the Frye/Daubert
dichotomy.
Jurisdictions can be broken down into three categories (or placed
in one of three) based on their approach to the admission of novel
scientific evidence: Frye, modified-Frye, or non-Frye. There are
currently73 fourteen Frye jurisdictions, three modified-Frye jurisdic-
tions, and thirty-four non-Frye jurisdictions.7 4 Because courts may
base a departure from Frye, as in Daubert, in part on FRE 702, it is
also helpful to compare whether a jurisdiction has adopted FRE 702
with its standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence.75
There are currently forty-five FRE 702 jurisdictions, with Illinois in
the minority of six jurisdictions that have not adopted FRE 702.76 In
addition to one non-FRE 702 jurisdiction, thirty-three of the forty-
five FRE 702 jurisdictions have rejected Frye.7 7 While an assessment
71. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 (discussing the role of relevance and
reliability in ensuring the jury performs its proper fact-finding role).
72. See Donaldson v. Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 325-26 n.1 (noting that the
parties did not argue, and the court did not consider, adopting a new standard in line with
Daubert); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996) (declining to raise the issue sua
sponte whether to abandon Frye and adopt the reasoning of Daubert), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1157 (1997), dismissal of post-conviction relief affd, No. 89408, 2002 WL 31839183 (I11. Sept. 4,
2002), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, No. 89408, 2003 WL 1705274 (Ill. April 1, 2003).
73. As of March 3, 2002.
74. See infra tbl. 1.
75. See infra tbls. 2-4.
76. See infra tbl. 2.
77. See infra tbls. 3, 4.
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of trends may be persuasive on its own, an examination of the post-
Daubert factors several jurisdictions considered while determining
which head of the Frye-hydra to assume may prove the most useful to
Illinois. This Part does just that, focusing on several jurisdictions
illustrative of the Frye, modified-Frye, and non-Frye approaches in
light of the Daubert trilogy.
A. Frye Jurisdictions
There are currently78 fourteen Frye jurisdictions,79 eight of which
have adopted FRE 702, or a variation thereof.80 The supreme courts
of only three jurisdictions, Arizona,81 California,82 and Washington,83
have discussed Daubert while reaffirming loyalty to the Frye general
acceptance standard. 84 Both Arizona and Washington have adopted
78. As of March 3, 2002.
79. See infra tbl. 1 (Arizona, California, D.C., Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
80. See infra tbl. 3.
81. Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000).
82. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994).
83. State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996).
84. Maryland adopted Frye in 1978, only three years after the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and fifteen years before Daubert. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. Ct.
App. 1978) (noting that in order to be admissible, a court must determine that a scientific
process or technique is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community). In a
footnote in 1995, the Maryland Supreme Court stated their continued allegiance to Frye despite
the state's adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1296 n.10
(Md. 1995) (mentioning that when Maryland adopted its Rule of Evidence 5-702 in 1994, the
committee made sure to note the adoption was not to overrule Frye's general acceptance
standard). The 1995 footnote was but one of four times the state supreme court mentioned
Daubert in the nine years since its inception. See Buxton v. Buxton, 770 A.2d 152, 161 (Md.
2000); Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 70, 80 (Md. 1999); Armstead v. State, 673 A.2d 221, 226 n.4
(Md. 1996); id. at 247 n.1 (Bell, J., dissenting).
In 1996 the Michigan legislature amended their version of FRE 702, MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 600.2955(1) (West 2000), to mirror Daubert's considerations. Section 600.2955, entitled
"Expert scientific opinion, admissibility; court determination, factors; novel scientific evidence;
medical malpractice actions," reads in pertinent part:
(1) In an action for the death of a person or for injury to a person or property, a scien-
tific opinion rendered by an otherwise qualified expert is not admissible unless the
court determines that the opinion is reliable and will assist the trier of fact. In making
that determination, the court shall examine the opinion and the basis for the opinion,
which basis includes the facts, technique, methodology, and reasoning relied on by the
expert, and shall consider all of the following factors:
(a) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific testing and
replication.
(b) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to peer review publication.
(c) The existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards governing the
application and interpretation of a methodology or technique and whether the opinion
and its basis are consistent with those standards.
(d) The known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis.
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FRE 702, and have framed their arguments in part on the relation
between FRE 702 and Frye, not necessarily the merits of retaining
Frye absent FRE 702. First, Arizona and Washington claim, contrary
to the United States Supreme Court, that adoption of FRE 702 did
(e) The degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted within the
relevant expert community. As used in this subdivision, "relevant expert community"
means individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of study and are gainfully em-
ployed applying that knowledge on the free market.
(f) Whether the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that field would
rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being proffered.
(g) Whether the opinion or methodology is relied upon by experts outside of the con-
text of litigation.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §600.2955. The Michigan Supreme Court has not dealt with the
application of Daubert since, but at least one Michigan appellate court has held that Frye has
officially been displaced. See, e.g., Greathouse v. Rhodes, 618 N.W.2d 106 (Mich. Ct. App.
2000) (stating the legislature enacted section 600.2955(1) in an apparent effort to codify
Daubert, and therefore abandoning the general acceptance test, and applying Daubert), rev'd on
other grounds, Greathouse v. Rhodes, 636 N.W.2d 138 (Mich. 2001). However, until the
Michigan Supreme Court acknowledges the legislature's intent, the Frye standard retains its
precedential value. Frye has been declared by the Michigan Supreme Court as the proper
standard, see People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995), and an appellate court lacks the
authority to supplant this.
The supreme courts of Florida, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania have all mentioned, yet
passed on determining whether Frye should still continue as the standard after Daubert. See
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) (avoiding discussion of Daubert, but
remaining mindful); State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260, 265 (N.H. 2000) (avoiding decision as to
whether Frye has been superseded by FRE 702 because the parties did not raise issue); Blum ex.
rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d 1, 7-8 (Pa. 2000) (stating that it would be
jurisprudentially unsound to use the present case to evaluate a change from Frye to Daubert).
Further, an examination of Florida case law reveals that a lack of sufficient reasoning and
justification is the common flaw of Frye's adoption. The Florida Supreme Court repeatedly
cites Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1989), as expressly adopting the Frye standard for
admission of novel scientific testimony. See, e.g., Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997)
(citing Stokes for the proposition that Frye is the standard for admission of novel scientific
testimony in Florida); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997) (stating that "[i]n Stokes,
this Court specifically rejected a balancing approach as being too impractical and difficult to
apply, and stated that the Frye standard is the proper standard for admission of novel scientific
expert testimony.") (internal citations omitted); Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Fla.
1995) (instructing that "the 'Frye test,' was expressly adopted by this Court in Bundy v. State,
and Stokes v. State") (internal citations omitted); Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828 (citing Stokes to
support the claim that novel scientific testimony is not admissible unless it meets the Frye
standard). In Stokes, the court addressed a concern over the admissibility of posthypnotic
testimony. After evaluating several other states approaches to the admission of posthypnotic
testimony, the court concluded that the Frye standard "properly addresses the issue of the
admissibility of posthypnotic testimony." Stokes, 548 So. 2d at 195 (emphasis added). The court
went through a litany of decisions germane to the issue of posthypnotic testimony from other
states, and wound up favoring the Frye standard as applied by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), to a balancing approach mirroring FRE 403.
Stokes, 548 So. 2d at 193-96. The Stokes court applied the Frye standard to the facts of the case,
but to say this established a standard for the admission of all novel scientific testimony is an
unsound leap common to Frye jurisdictions. See also Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582
(D.C. 1999); Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Co., 14 P.3d 1170 (Kan. 2000); Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d
1083 (Miss. 1998); People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1996); Callahan v. Cardinal
Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
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not in effect supersede the general acceptance standard.85  The
Washington Supreme Court stated that the FRE 702 inquiry and
Frye/Daubert issue are separate, that in practice "[Rule] 702 has a
significant role in admissibility of scientific evidence aside from
Frye." 6 The Arizona Supreme Court noted that nothing in either the
text, the comments by the court or its committees, or the cases
decided after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, sug-
gested the intention to include a reliability standard in Arizona Rule
of Evidence 702.87 Second, Arizona and Washington claimed there is
simply no reason to abandon Frye, for as the Arizona court asserted,
"our experience with the Frye rule has not been bad."88  Third,
Arizona and Washington were skeptical of the role of a judge as
gatekeeper. Judges, as the Arizona Supreme Court put it, lack the
scientific or technical expertise necessary to properly tell "good
science from junk, true scientists from charlatans, truthful experts
from liars, and venal from objective experts.
' '89
California, however, based its argument in part on the doctrine
of stare decisis.90 The California Supreme Court claimed that since
the controlling decision of People v. Kelly,91 which adopted the
general acceptance standard in 1976, there has been "[n]o significant
relevant developments ... to justify abandoning its conclusions. '"92
85. After noting how the Supreme Court found a reliability standard inherent in the
adoption of FRE 702, the Arizona court stated:
Turning to our rules, nothing in the comments of this court or its committees indicated
that a reliability standard was contemplated by our adoption of Ariz. R. Evid. 702.
Given the rule's text and cases... all decided after we adopted Ariz. R. Evid. 702-we
could not now discover such a standard implicit in the language of the rule.
Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 128. The Washinton supreme court commented that
while in Daubert the Court observed that the legislative adoption of the federal rules
of evidence postdated and superseded the Frye decision, in Washington the rules of
evidence were adopted by this court and do not constitute a legislative enactment
superseding Frye. Thus, when this court, after the rules of evidence were adopted,
continued to adhere to Frye, we signaled that Frye and the evidence rules coexist as
the law of this state.
Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1314 (citation omitted).
86. Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1314 (emphasis added). The court further stated that FRE 702
has independent force and effect, where utilizing both a "helpfulness standard" of FRE 702, and
the general acceptance standard of Frye provides the "best of both worlds." Id.
87. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 128.
88. Id.; Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1314 ("the Frye standard has endured for over 70 years,
indicating that it has not been so difficult to apply as to call for its abandonment").
89. Logerquist, 1 P.3d at 129; see also Copeland, 922 P.2d at 1315 ("judges may lack the
understanding of scientific principles and methodology to evaluate science, including social
science, as now required by Daubert").
90. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321,328 (Cal. 1994).
91. 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1979).
92. Leahy, 882 P.2d at 328.
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Specifically, the court states that it has applied Kelly/Frye numerous
times without a problem,93 and the legislature has had ample time to
modify the evidence code to preclude general acceptance. 94
B. Modified-Frye Jurisdictions
As Frye's general acceptance standard is not a constitutionally
mandated requirement, 91 it is susceptible to modification as well as
acceptance or rejection. There are currently % three jurisdictions that
use a modified Frye standard: Alabama, 97 Minnesota, 98 and New
Jersey. 99 All have adopted FRE 702, or a variation thereof.1' ° Ala-
bama utilizes both the Frye and Daubert standards, basing the choice
of application on the type of evidence presented for admission.
Alabama courts apply Daubert in all cases concerning the admission
of DNA evidence, while Frye remains the standard for other types of
scientific evidence. 1°1 Accordingly, Alabama escapes characterization
as either a Frye or a Daubert jurisdiction. Minnesota employs a two-
prong test for the admission of novel scientific evidence.Y32 The first
93. Id. at 331. ("Despite the criticism of Kelly/Frye, this court has had numerous occasions
to review and apply the doctrine, and has done so without apparent difficulty or critical
comment.").
94. Id.:
[T]he Legislature has had ample opportunity to amend the Evidence Code provisions
to abrogate or modify the general acceptance standard that Kelly found implicit within
them. The Legislature has made frequent amendments to the expert testimony provi-
sions of that code since its adoption in 1965. Legislative failure to amend sections 720
or 801, although not conclusive, may be presumed to signify legislative acquiescence in
our Kelly decision.
(internal citations omitted).
95. Likewise, since Daubert involves the interpretation of a statute, FRE 702, and not the
constitution, it is not binding on the states.
96. As of March 3, 2002.
97. Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355 (Ala. 1998).
98. Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000).
99. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1991).
100. See infra tbl. 2.
101. See Turner, 746 So. 2d 355; Ex parte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991). Two years
before the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert, the Alabama Supreme Court
modified the Frye standard to deal with the admission of DNA evidence, creating a Frye-plus
standard. See id. at 248. One year after Daubert, the Alabama legislature established a state
DNA data bank, Ala. Code § 36-18-20, and in the process specifically addressed the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence. In Turner, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the state's DNA
statute, Ala. Code §36-18-30(f), which states that "genetic identification established through
DNA testing and analysis should be admissible as a matter of evidence in all courts of this state
and that juries, both civil and criminal, should be responsible for assessing the weight, if any, to
be given to expert testimony or evidence," as an explicit undertaking by the state legislature to
adopt the Daubert standard in place of Frye. Turner, 746 So. 2d at 359.
102. See Goeb, 615 N.W.2d at 809-14 (reaffirming adherence to Frye/Mack standard after
examination of Daubert).
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prong consists of the Frye standard, requiring general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community. 10 3 The second prong, first an-
nounced in State v. Mack, requires that the particular evidence
derived from the generally accepted test have a scientifically reliable
foundation.'0 n New Jersey has modified the Frye standard in toxic-
tort litigation based on the assumption that "toxic-tort litigation does
not frequently encounter well-established and widely-accepted
scientific theories of causation that can, at the level demanded by the
scientific method, precisely delineate the causal path between the
toxin and the pathology."10  Therefore, the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated that:
[I]n toxic-tort litigation, a scientific theory of causation that has not
yet reached general acceptance may be found to be sufficiently reli-
able if it is based on a sound, adequately-founded scientific meth-
odology involving data and information of the type reasonably
relied on by experts in the scientific field.1°6
C. Non-Frye Jurisdictions
In addition to the Frye and modified-Frye jurisdictions are those
that can be classified as non-Frye jurisdictions. There are currently'0 7
thirty-four jurisdictions that have rejected Frye's general acceptance
standard. 10 8 Of these, only one state, Georgia, has failed to adopt
FRE 702, or a variation thereof.0 9 These jurisdictions can be broken
down into three categories based on their present standard for
admission of novel scientific evidence: common law jurisdictions, 0
103. Id. at 809.
104. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. 1980). Minnesota recognized that in
order to ensure reliability, Frye must be modified to specifically include a test for reliability. See
also Harris v. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d 55, 60 (I11. App. Ct. 1999) (pronouncing the since overruled
"Frye plus reliability" test), overruled by Donaldson v. Cent. 11. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314
(Ill. 2002).
105. Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733,747 (N.J. 1991).
106. Id. at 747-48.
107. As of March 3, 2002.
108. See infra tbls. 1-2 (Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
109. See infra tbl. 2.
110. There are two common law jurisdictions, Georgia and Utah. In Harper v. State, the
Georgia Supreme Court determined the Frye rule of "counting heads" inappropriate for
determining the admissibility of a scientific procedure, choosing instead to adopt a standard
allowing "the trial judge to decide whether the procedure or technique in question has reached
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Daubert jurisdictions,," and rule-based jurisdictions. 112 Georgia and
Utah, the two common law jurisdictions, employ judicially created
a scientific stage of verifiable certainty." 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (Ga. 1982). The court noted three
problems inherent in the Frye standard:
First, the expert is selected and compensated by a party seeking to demonstrate a
specific premise: that the scientific principle sought to be proved either is or is not
accepted in the scientific community. Such a process may result in a battle between
each party's experts at trial. Also, there are limits on what any one "expert" may un-
derstand about a particular discipline. And, last, we acknowledge that wide variations
in intradisciplinary opinions frequently exist.
Id. The court also provided several methods to determine when a scientific technique or
procedure has achieved a scientific stage of "verifiable certainty," such as (1) expert testimony
by the parties, (2) exhibits, (3) treatises or (4) case law from outside jurisdictions. Id. at 395-96.
Additionally, important to note (as Georgia is the only non-Frye non-FRE 702 state) is
Georgia's applicable equivalent to FRE 702; it is much broader, stating that expert opinion "on
any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible." GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-9-67 (1995).
Utah courts apply a three-part test in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, a
test recently upheld reflecting Daubert's "more flexible approach." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d
638, 642 (Utah 1996). The test requires the trial court to determine (1) "whether the scientific
principles and techniques underlying the expert's testimony are inherently reliable"; (2) whether
"the scientific principles or techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the
particular case by sufficiently qualified experts"; and (3) "whether the proffered scientific
evidence will be more probative than prejudicial." Id. at 641. The Utah Supreme Court
determined their standard, which was established four years prior to Daubert, to be an effective
guide, adding that it "was based, in part, on Utah case law which 'superimposes a more
restrictive test whenever scientific evidence is at issue."' Id. at 642. (citation omitted). The goal
of Utah's standard is to ensure "inherent reliability," instructing the trial court to consider
"general scientific acceptance and widespread practical application, [but] must focus in all
events on proof of inherent reliability." Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980).
111. Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming are Daubert jurisdictions. See infra tbl. 1.
112. Rule-based jurisdictions include: Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio. See infra tbl. 1. These states
base their standard for the admission of scientific testimony on their versions of FRE 702.
These approaches parallel Daubert in all respects but one, as the courts formulate their own
methods to ensure reliability apart from the five Daubert considerations. By definition every
jurisdiction could be called a rule-based jurisdiction, as all follow their own evidentiary statutes.
In this Note, however, rule-based jurisdictions refers to those that utilize FRE 702 as their
standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence without also using Daubert's five
considerations. In South Carolina, for example, a trial court analyzes scientific evidence to
determine if (1) the evidence will assist the trier of fact, (2) the expert witness is properly
qualified, and (3) the underlying science is reliable. State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C.
1999). As far as ensuring reliability, the South Carolina Supreme Court has outlined a four-part
test similar to Daubert, requiring the trial court to look at: (1) publications and peer review; (2)
prior application of the method to the type of evidence involved; (3) quality control procedures
used to ensure reliability; and (4) consistency of the method with recognized scientific laws and
procedures. See, e.g., State v. Ford, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1990); see also State v. Gleason,
844 P.2d 691, 694 (Idaho 1992) ("reaffirm[ing] that the appropriate test for measuring the
scientific reliability of evidence is I.R.E. 702."); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d
453, 460-61 (Ind. 2001) (stating that the adoption of FRE 702 intended to liberalize the
admission of reliable scientific testimony, contrary to Frye's narrow standard, yet declining to
utilize Daubert as more than helpful jurisprudence); Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735,
739 (Ohio 1998) (stating the state's version of FRE 702 governs the admissibility of expert
testimony); Yamaha Motor Co., U.S.A. v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661, 667 (Nev. 1998) (declaring that
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standards based on both prior case law and, in the case of Georgia, an
applicable state statute.'13 Rule-based jurisdictions have all adopted
versions of FRE 702 and frame their standard for the admission of
novel scientific evidence on an interpretation of their versions of FRE
702. 4 Rule-based jurisdictions differ from Daubert jurisdictions
solely in their lack of reliance on the five considerations announced
by the Supreme Court in Daubert."5 Finally, Daubert jurisdictions are
exactly what their categorization implies, jurisdictions that have
adopted the reasoning and approach of Daubert and its progeny.
While each jurisdiction may differ slightly in its reasoning and proc-
ess, there are certain common elements essential to a full and proper
evaluation of the change from Frye to Daubert. The Alaska Supreme
Court did a thorough job in considering all of the relevant arguments
both for Frye's retention and for Daubert's adoption.
In State v. Coon, the Alaska Supreme Court evaluated the shift
from Frye to Daubert in light of the state's evidentiary rules, specifi-
cally Rules 702 and 703.116 The court held that its evidentiary rules
expert testimony must assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or issue in dispute,
and "must also satisfy the prerequisites of all relevant evidence, i.e., that its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect."); State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-40
(N.C. 1995) (providing that the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by North
Carolina's version of FRE 702).
113. See supra note 110.
114. See supra note 112.
115. See supra note 112; see also supra text accompanying notes 51-55 (listing the five
Daubert considerations).
116. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999). Alaska Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 were
substantively identical to FRE 702 and 703. The following is the argument presented to the
court, which is the typical anti-Frye argument:
The State argues that we should abandon the Frye standard. It asserts that Frye has
become outdated and inadequate for modern litigation, where many cases involve
sophisticated scientific data and knowledge. It argues that Frye uses social, rather than
scientific, criteria for determining reliability and validity when reviewing a novel scien-
tific technique. This causes trial courts simply to "count hands" to determine whether
scientists in the relevant scientific community accept the technique as reliable, and
"abdicates" judicial responsibility for determining admissibility to scientists unedu-
cated in the law.
The State also argues that a few dissenters within a scientific community may prevent a
finding of general acceptance, leading to overrepresentation of the dissenters' views.
In addition, the State contends that Frye's conservative nature causes a "gross time
lag" between the development of a new scientific technique and its judicial admissibil-
ity. This can cause certain cutting edge science to become obsolete before it is admis-
sible under Frye.
Id. at 392. The court further noted that:
Although the United States Supreme Court stated in Daubert that Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 is the "locus" for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, the
commentary to the Alaska Rules of Evidence provides support for the State's view
that Alaska Rule of Evidence 703 is also a source for an approach broader than the
Frye standard.
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"give the trial courts both the authority and the responsibility to
determine the admissibility of [scientific] evidence without being
limited to the general acceptance standard," adding further that
"[o]ur evidence rules contemplate a broader inquiry, allowing a
proponent to establish admissibility even if general acceptance is
absent, and allowing an opponent to challenge admissibility even if
general acceptance is present.""' 7  The court also recognized the
"capricious" effect of Frye in "exclud[ing] scientifically reliable
evidence which is not yet generally accepted, and admit[ting] scien-
tifically unreliable evidence which although generally accepted,
cannot meet rigorous scientific scrutiny.""11  Thus, the court an-
nounced its adoption of Daubert and continued by dealing with
several arguments and "dire predictions supporting the status quo." 119
First, the court addressed the concern that Daubert will unduly
burden trial judges, requiring them to be amateur scientists assessing
scientific reliability. In quelling this fear, the court first acknowledged
the initial persuasion of this concern: that scientists are better suited
to assess scientific reliability than are judges, as the latter rarely
receive scientific training. However, "closer consideration reveals
that the notion is misleading and irrelevant," as "scientific reliability
is not necessarily congruent with judicial reliability."' 20 Rather than
allow scientists to asses legal admissibility, the court emphasized that
"[d]etermining reliability for judicial purposes is unavoidably the
responsibility of trial courts, and should not be delegated to an
Id. at 393. This should be particularly interesting to Illinois, as FRE 703 was adopted in 1981.
See infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
117. Coon, 974 P.2d. at 393.
118. Id. at 393-94. The court added that "[b]ecause the Frye test potentially excludes
evidence that should be admitted under our rules, and also potentially admits evidence that
should be excluded under our rules, we conclude that it is both unduly restrictive and unduly
permissive." Id. at 394.
119. Id. at 395.
120. Id. at 396. The court adds that Frye illustrates the difference between scientific
reliability and judicial reliability itself, stating that the "'general acceptance' standard does not
define scientific reliability; it is simply a judicial construction. And for reasons noted above, it is
a flawed judicial construction." Id.; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
590 n.9 (1993) (internal citations omitted):
We note that scientists typically distinguish between "validity" (does the principle
support what it purports to show?) and "reliability" (does application of the principle
produce consistent results?). Although "the difference between accuracy, validity, and
reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen's
kick," our reference here is to evidentiary reliability-that is, trustworthiness.... In a




expert's peers.'' 12 The court concluded that the burden of evaluating
novel scientific evidence may be substantial, but it is a burden that
trial and appellate courts must bear. 122
Second, the court tackled the concern that Daubert's more liberal
approach will result in "junk science" making its way to the jury. 23 In
dealing with this contention, the court noted the problems inherent in
Frye: its manipulability and failure to define clear parameters for its
application.124 Comparing these problems to the results from several
reported decisions applying Daubert, the court concluded, "[w]e are
not convinced that 'junk science' is more likely to be admitted under
Daubert than under Frye."'125
III. THE ILLINOIS APPROACH
The history of Frye in Illinois is short and ill defined. It was not
until the mid-1970s that Frye's general acceptance standard was first
mentioned, the early-1980s that the Illinois Supreme Court arguably
first applied Frye, and the mid-1990s before it was clear that Illinois
was in fact a Frye jurisdiction. One explanation for this ragged past
may be the increased use of expert testimony at trial.
The 1970s saw a dramatic increase in the use of scientific evi-
dence, forcing courts to rule on the admissibility of many newly
discovered or applied scientific principals. It was a time of great
discovery and progress, with developments such as the microproces-
sor, ultrasound diagnostics, and DNA mapping. Medical malpractice,
product liability, and personal injury claims became commonplace
and complex. As a result, expert witness testimony became a re-
121. Coon, 974 P.2d at 396.
122. At this point the court noted that independent expert witnesses could be employed by
courts in adjudging difficult disputes, but that most disputes will be solved with "relatively little
effort." Id.
123. Id. at 396-97; see also Phillips v. Indus, Mach., 597 N.W.2d 377, 388-89 (Neb. 1999)
(Gerrard, J., concurring):
The "gatekeeper" function exercised by trial courts under the Daubert/Kumho Tire
analysis is, in fact, a more effective means of excluding unreliable expert testimony
than is the Frye test The experience in jurisdictions which have adopted the Daubert
standards suggests that the admission of so-called "junk science" evidence is a minimal
risk.
124. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A-B (discussing the problems applying Frye, and also the
problems resulting from its application).
125. Coon, 974 P.2d at 397 (asserting "[flurthermore, Frye also potentially permits
admission of unreliable scientific evidence, because a methodology that has been generally
accepted might nonetheless have been discredited during a Daubert inquiry").
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quirement. 126 As the comments to FRE 702 state, "[a]n intelligent
evaluation of facts is often difficult or impossible without the applica-
tion of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The
most common source of this knowledge is the expert witness.... ,,127
In order to preserve the proper role of the jury, courts fashioned rules
regulating the admission of novel scientific evidence, and the era of
Frye in Illinois began.
A. Frye's Evolution in Illinois
The first Illinois court to cite 28 Frye was the Second District Ap-
pellate Court in 1976,129 followed shortly thereafter by the Fifth
District Appellate Court in 1979.130 The Illinois Supreme Court first
mentioned, and purportedly adopted Frye in the 1981 decision of
People v. Baynes. 3' The Baynes court considered an issue similar to
that in Frye: whether to allow the admission of polygraph evidence at
trial.'12 Before discussing the merits of the case, the court briefly
described the history of the polygraph test, in large part by quoting
Frye.13 3 The court then concluded its discussion134 of Frye by adding
126. See, e.g,, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-623 (2001) (effective July 1, 1982) (requiring
plaintiff to file affidavit of expert averring merits of claim); Cynthia H. Cwik, Guarding the
Gate: Expert Evidence Admissibility, LTIG., Summer 1999, at 6. According to Cwik:
As our world and our courtrooms have become more and more complex, expert evi-
dence has become more and more important. In litigation that involves issues on the
frontier of science-toxic tort litigation, for example-the success or failure of the case
may well hinge on the admissibility of expert testimony. In medical malpractice or
product liability cases, admissible expert testimony on such issues as proximate cause
will almost certainly be needed to avoid a directed verdict and get to the jury. Without
expert support, there is very often no case.
Id.
127. FED. R. EVlD. 702 cmt.
128. As of April 12, 2003, only seventy published Illinois cases have cited Frye.
129. See People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (admitting expert testimony
concerning bite-mark evidence due to its sufficient reliability after citing Frye).
130. See People v. Monigan, 390 N.E.2d 562 (I11. App. Ct. 1979) (excluding polygraph
evidence as unreliable and untrustworthy after acknowledging and quoting the "landmark" case
of Frye).
131. 430 N.E.2d 1070 (Ill. 1981).
132. Id. at 1072. The defendant took a polygraph test prior to trial, after defense counsel,
the defendant, and the state's attorney stipulated the results would be admissible at trial. The
results, which were unfavorable to the defendant, were introduced at trial without objection.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, one issue being whether admission of the
polygraph evidence had an obvious prejudicial impact on the jury. Id. at 1072-74.
133. Id. at 1074 (quoting the Frye court's description of the systolic blood pressure test).
134. The court in People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996) identifies Baynes as
"discussing" Frye. If the Miller court meant quoting Frye's general acceptance passage as
discussion it is correct. If the Miller court meant discussion as in a meaningful examination of
Frye and its soundness, however, the Miller court would be wrong.
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the D.C. court's famous passage announcing the general acceptance
standard. 135  That was the extent of the discussion of Frye and its
general acceptance standard.136  The polygraph evidence was then
held inadmissible, not because of a failure to attain general accep-
tance, but rather because "[p]olygraph evidence is not reliable
enough to be admitted. The prejudicial effects substantially outweigh
the probative value of admitting such testimony.' 137 The court,
therefore, framed the issue in terms of the probative versus prejudi-
cial value of polygraph evidence, not necessarily the level of accep-
tance in the scientific community as Frye dictates. 13 8
Although the Baynes court fell short of expressly adopting or ap-
plying the Frye test, the Illinois Supreme Court subsequently recog-
nized the decision as doing just that. In People v. Jordan,'139 the court
cited Baynes as adopting the proposition that while "rendering an
opinion, the expert must rely upon scientific theories which have
gained general acceptance in his field."' 14 Once again, however, the
Jordan court merely mentioned the general acceptance standard
without either analyzing or relying on it for the disposition of the
135. See supra text accompanying note 23.
136. "Unfortunately, in most instances judicial adoption of the general acceptance standard
has not been accompanied by a supporting rationale. This is especially true of the early cases,
which often cited Frye without comment or analysis." Giannelli, supra note 22, at 1206. This,
unfortunately, seems to be the situation in Illinois.
137. Baynes, 430 N.E.2d at 1079. The polygraph evidence was determined to be unreliable,
and as such inadmissible. The court then addressed the parties stipulation to admission of the
polygraph evidence, stating:
A stipulation does not necessarily make inadmissible evidence admissible. By what
logic should stipulated polygraph evidence be admitted if the same evidence, absent a
stipulation, is barred? How does the agreement lend credibility to an examination that
would not otherwise be given judicial recognition? If evidence is unreliable, agreeing
to its admission does not make it reliable.
Id. at 1077.
138. The court held that "if the instrument is accurate and the recording of the instrument's
results reliable, then we should conclude it is acceptable. But the process has not reached a
level of sophistication that makes it generally more probative than prejudicial." Id. This is
similar to an inquiry under FRE 403. FED. R. EvID. 403; see also People v. Cruz, 643 N.E.2d
636, 652 (Ill. 1994) (court can exclude evidence if probative value is outweighed by danger of
prejudice, confusion, or delay).
139. 469 N.E.2d 569, 576 (Ill. 1984) (the second Illinois Supreme Court decision to cite
Frye).
140. Id. (citations omitted). The defendants objected to testimony regarding the "pink-
tooth" theory as evidence of cause of death. The court upheld the expert's testimony because
(1) the defense experts did not deny the existence of the "pink-tooth phenomenon," (2) the
"pink-tooth" theory is outside the realm of knowledge of lay persons, and (3) the experts'
testimony aided the trier of fact in understanding the theory and its causes. Id. at 577.
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case.,4' In People v. Zayas,'42 the Illinois Supreme Court held that it
had in fact applied the Frye standard in Baynes. The Zayas court held
that hypnotically induced testimony was unreliable, and as such,
inadmissible at trial. In doing so, it applied the "Baynes polygraph
analysis," while noting the similarities of inaccuracy and intrusion
upon the proper functioning of the jury.143 The court then provided
its first substantive reasoning for application of the Frye standard.
Quoting an Alaska Supreme Court case, 144 the Zayas court empha-
sized:
[F]our persuasive reasons why the Frye standard is particularly well
suited to handle this question:
"(1) [T~he standard is judicially manageable; (2) the standard saves
judicial time and resources; (3) the standard assures that juries will
not be misled by unproven, unsound 'scientific' procedures, thus
safeguarding the court's truth-finding role; and (4) the standard as-
sures fairness and uniformity of decision-making.'
45
The Zayas court held the evidence inadmissible, but once again failed
to frame its holding in terms of general acceptance. The court stated
"that because its reliability is suspect . . . [it] is not admissible in
Illinois courts," adding "[w]e are not concerned with whether evi-
dence is plausible but, rather, whether evidence is reliable."' 146 In
addition to its unreliability, the court noted the probative value of
hypnotically induced testimony as questionable, and admission as a
strain on the judicial process. 47 Thus, although the Illinois Supreme
Court has repeatedly cited Baynes and Zayas as the basis for the
adoption of Frye, those decisions simply mention the general accep-
tance standard while framing the issue in terms of reliability and
probative versus prejudicial value. Perhaps due to this ambiguity, in
141. The court made no statement regarding general acceptance of the "pink-tooth" theory
in the relevant scientific community, simply that no experts testified at trial that it was not
recognized in the dental community. Id.
142. 546 N.E.2d 513 (I11. 1989).
143. Id. at 517 ("Jurors seem to demonstrate the same misunderstanding and false sense of
confidence in hypnotic evidence as they have historically shown with regard to polygraph
evidence." (citation omitted)).
144. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986). Alaska has since abandoned the Frye
standard in favor of Daubert. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999); supra notes 116-25
and accompanying text.
145. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d at 517-18 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 518.
147. Id.
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Harris v. Cropmate,14 the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court
added a reliability prong to Frye's general acceptance standard.14
9
B. Harris v. Cropmate: The "Frye Plus Reliability" Standard
In the 1999 case of Harris v. Cropmate, the Illinois Fourth Dis-
trict Appellate Court announced its "Frye plus reliability" standard
for the admission of novel scientific evidence. 50 Because a trial judge
may always exclude evidence that is in fact unreliable, the new
standard requires a judge to make a determination of the reliability of
evidence separate from and in addition to the Frye test. After noting
the goals the Frye standard seeks to achieve, 51 the court recom-
mended a six-part analytical inquiry for the admission of novel
scientific evidence. 5 2 First, the court must determine precisely what
the party has offered the evidence to prove.153 Second, the court will
decide whether the proffered evidence will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or determine facts in issue. 5 4  Third, the
court will consider whether the evidence constitutes science, or if it is
the nonscientific specialized knowledge of an expert.5 5 Fourth, if the
evidence is scientific, the court will determine if is it novel science, or
if it involves a firmly established method or technique. 156 Fifth, if the
evidence is novel, the court will decide if the evidence meets the Frye
148. 706 N.E.2d 55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
149. See infra notes 150-66 and accompanying text.
150. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d 55; see also JOHN E. CORKERY, ILLINOIS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 702.112 (2000) (discussing the "Frye plus reliability" standard).
151. The court lists six accomplishments of the Frye standard, including its ability to ensure
the reliability of the evidence, protect the jury from evidence that could unduly influence their
proper role, and impose a threshold standard of reliability in light of the fact that cross-
examination cannot bring inaccuracies to the attention of the jury. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d at 59-
60.
152. Id. at 59-65.
153. Id. at 59-60.
154. Id. This is similar to the second prong of the trial judges role as gatekeeper under
Daubert. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
155. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d at 59-62. Determining whether the proffered evidence
constitutes scientific knowledge is another of the gatekeeping functions a Daubert court must
perform. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. The court stated that although Illinois
has not adopted Daubert, the Court's discussion of what constitutes "scientific knowledge" is
helpful in its analysis of what constitutes scientific opinion testimony. Id.; see also Daubert, 509
U.S. at 590 (describing what constitutes "scientific knowledge").
156. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d. at 60, 62-64. The court stated that similar controlling precedent
should be examined to determine the novelty of the scientific evidence. Further, if the evidence
is not novel, than Frye has been satisfied as the scientific method or technique has been
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. Id.
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standard.157 Sixth, after determining whether the evidence satisfies
the general acceptance standard, the court must ask if the evidence is
reliable. 158 As for the sixth inquiry, the court offered six nonexclusive
questions the trial court may ask to determine reliability. While
considering the "totality of the circumstances," the court may ask:
(1) Can the scientific technique or method employed be empirically
tested, and if so, has it been?['59] (2) Has the technique or method
been subjected to peer review and publication?l601 (3) What is the
technique or method's known or potential error rate?l' 6] (4) Are its
underlying data reliable?[ 62] (5) Is the witness proposing to testify
about matters growing naturally and directly out of research she
has conducted independently of the litigation, or has the witness
developed her opinion solely for the purpose of testifying?1 63, and
(6) Did the witness form her opinion and then look for reasons to
support it, rather than doing research that led her to her conclu-
sion? 164
After pronouncing what has also been called a "Frye plus
Daubert" standard, the court stressed that the trial court's inquiry
should be flexible. 165 The court stated that while reliance on the
community of experts to help decide admissibility is necessary to an
extent, "the court may not delegate its authority as gatekeeper to the
scientific community." 166 Cropmate's new standard would not survive
long.
157. Id. at 60, 64. The court goes on to state that a Frye hearing can and should be held if
the evidence is novel. Id.
158. Id. at 60, 64-65. Assuring the reliability of novel scientific evidence is the driving force
behind the Daubert test.
159. This is the first consideration under Daubert. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
160. This is the second consideration under Daubert. See supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
161. This is the third consideration under Daubert. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
162. This is also comparable to the third consideration under Daubert. See supra note 53
and accompanying text. Once a court is aware of the known or potential rate of error for a
scientific technique or method, the reliability of the underlying data is most likely already
known. In other words, the reliability of the data involved is one factor in the known or
potential rate of error for that technique or method.
163. This is a question any competent attorney would ask on cross-examination, and would
appear to go more toward the weight of the testimony than its reliability.
164. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d at 65 (citations omitted). The process of forming a hypothesis
and then finding data to support it is disfavored in the scientific community. It is comparable to
drawing a target centered around shots already fired, and firing at a target already drawn; only
the latter produces meaningful, reliable results.
165. Id.; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (noting the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules of
Evidence favors relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony).
166. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d at 65 (emphasis added).
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C. Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.:
A Step Backwards
In Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., the Illinois
Supreme Court emphatically declared that "Illinois law is unequivo-
cal: the exclusive test for the admission of expert testimony is gov-
erned by the standard first expressed in Frye v. United States.1 167 The
Donaldson court overruled Cropmate's "Frye plus reliability" stan-
dard, asserting that a "trial court is not required to conduct a two-part
inquiry into both the reliability of the methodology and its general
acceptance."' 168 In doing so, the court claimed that a "determination
of the reliability of an expert's methodology is naturally subsumed by
the inquiry into its general acceptance in the scientific community.
Simply put, a principle or technique is not generally accepted in the
scientific community if it is by nature unreliable.1' 69 The "Frye plus
reliability" standard therefore met its demise, and the general accep-
tance standard was once again endorsed by yet another Illinois
Supreme Court opinion without legitimate discussion or supporting
rationale.
70
IV. THE FRYF./DAUBERT DEBATE
The Frye general acceptance standard has been either rejected or
modified by a large majority of jurisdictions, and has been widely
criticized in legal journals. 7' Illinois should follow suit by rejecting
Frye in favor of a Daubert and/or FRE 702-based approach. Frye's
167. Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 323 (Ill. 2002). The court went
on to cite Miller, Zayas, Jordan, and Baynes to support this claim. Id.
168. Id. at 326.
169. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying
text (argument that reliability is not subsumed in general acceptance as the court declares).
170. The court also included some rather confusing, contradictory langue in its opinion. In
subsequent paragraphs, the court stated:
First, "general acceptance" does not concern the ultimate conclusion. Rather, the
proper focus of the general acceptance test is on the underlying methodology used to
generate the conclusion. If the underlying method used to generate an expert's opinion
are reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field, the fact finder may consider the
opinion-despite the novelty of the conclusion rendered by the expert....
Second, general acceptance of methodologies does not mean "universal" acceptance of
methodologies. The medical community may entertain diverse opinions regarding
causal relationships, but this diversity of opinion does not preclude the admission of
testimony that a causal relationship exists if the expert used generally accepted method-
ology to develop the conclusion.
Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 324. The distinction can most likely be credited to the clash between
FRE 703 and Frye. See infra note 224.
171. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 20, § 1-5(G), at 27.
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criticism and problems fall into two broad categories: problems in
applying Frye and problems resulting from Frye's use. When a trial
court attempts to apply Frye, it must itself define many of the stan-
dard parameters, such as the relevant scientific community and the
amount of approval required for general acceptance. Once a court
utilizes Frye, the problems continue, as it may either include unreli-
able evidence or exclude reliable evidence. After seventy years, these
problems and many others remain unsolved, begging the question:
why adhere to an outdated, seldom-followed standard with faults still
unresolved after seventy years? The better approach is to adopt the
Daubert trilogy, or at least a flexible FRE 702-based standard capable
of evolving with the times.
A. Problems Applying Frye: The What, Who, How, and How Much
Frye, on its face and through its operation, applies only to novel
scientific evidence. 172 This fact raises the following problems: (1)
defining "novel," (2) defining "scientific evidence," and (3) determin-
ing what standard to apply to the admission of other types of expert
evidence. Since Frye applies only to novel science, a trial court must
initially determine if the technique or method in question is novel.
The Illinois Supreme Court has correctly recognized that "a 'new' or
'novel' scientific technique is not always easy to identify, especially in
light of constant scientific advances in our modem era."' 73 With this
in mind, the court defined "novel" by quoting Webster's Dictionary,
stating that "a scientific technique is 'new' or 'novel' if it is 'original or
striking' or does 'not resembl[e] something formerly known or
used." ' 174 This type of vague and virtually useless explanation leaves a
trial court in no better a position, especially in our modern scientific
era. A court may perceive as new a technique only months old when,
as is often the case, it is old news in the scientific community. Addi-
tionally, Frye does not specify whether the general acceptance
standard applies to scientifically novel or judicially novel techniques
and methods. Further, Frye fails to specify the standard to apply in
subsequent hearings to admit a scientific technique previously held
172. The standard deals with scientific principles or discoveries, without mention of
technical or other specialized knowledge. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
173. Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 325.
174. Id. (quoting WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1546 (1993)).
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inadmissible.'7 5 To illustrate, consider polygraph evidence, the issue
that gave rise to Frye itself. The Illinois Supreme Court has held
polygraph evidence inadmissible at trial due to its failure to satisfy
Frye.176  The polygraph technique is not scientifically novel, and
though it is not admissible in Illinois courts, it is not judicially novel
either. According to Donaldson, Frye applies only to novel tech-
niques, and novel is defined as "original or striking." Polygraph
evidence, thus, falls outside that definition, as it is not original or
striking, so Frye's strict general acceptance standard arguably would
not apply. Under Frye's reasoning, it is not clear what standard a
court would apply. This vagueness plagues Frye's general acceptance
standard.
FRE 702 and the Daubert trilogy, on the other hand, not only
provide a definitive approach to the admission of all types of expert
testimony, but also a body of modern case law to aid a court in its role
of ensuring reliability. First, FRE 702 applies regardless of the
novelty of the evidence, foregoing the daunting task of determining
whether something is novel. Next, Daubert offers a workable defini-
tion of what constitutes science (and knowledge), a fact the Fourth
District noted in Cropmate.77 Last, Daubert, as extended through
Kumho, applies to all types of expert testimony providing uniformity
at the trial level. Therefore, unlike the rigid Frye standard, Daubert is
better suited to advance and adapt in a high-speed, technologically
advanced world.
While the Frye standard requires general acceptance by the rele-
vant scientific community, it fails to provide guidance as to who
makes up that community. Not only may scientific methods or
techniques fall within many different communities, but selection of
the relevant community may prove dispositive of the case. 178 If the
relevant community chosen is too narrow, the views of a few fringe
scientists may satisfy the test, contrary to Frye's rationale. Alterna-
175. Alternatively, as the Nebraska Supreme Court notes, "once an issue is determined
under Frye, it is closed to further Frye analysis because it is no longer 'novel.' Daubert. on the
other hand, permits re-examination of the issue if the validity of the prior determination can be
appropriately questioned." Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 874 (Neb. 2001).
176. See Baynes, 430 N.E.2d 1070. But see supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text
(discussing how, although the Illinois Supreme Court repeatedly cites Baynes as utilizing Frye,
the Baynes court framed its decision in terms of reliability and prejudice).
177. See Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d at 60-62 (discussing the third prong of the "Frye plus
reliability test," which asks if the proffered testimony constitutes scientific evidence).
178. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 20, § 1-5(B); Giannelli, supra note 22, at
1208-10.
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tively, if the community chosen is too broad, for example including
many different scientific disciplines, general acceptance may be
impossible to prove due to disagreement between disciplines despite
widespread approval within one discipline. For example, research
shows that the admission of talker identification techniques correlates
directly with the size of the scientific community chosen.179 If the
relevant scientific community chosen is broad, consisting of all
applicable relevant practice areas,180 not one jurisdiction examined
admitted the expert's testimony. However, if the scientific commu-
nity chosen consisted of solely the field that performed the talker
identification test, not one jurisdiction examined excluded the ex-
pert's testimony.sl Additionally, David H. Kaye & George F. Sensa-
baugh, Jr. have declared that it is not possible to define the
appropriate relevant scientific communities with regard to DNA
testing.11 2 Daubert solves this dilemma by making general acceptance
but one of the factors to consider, therefore diluting the problems
inherent in a one-factor test. Therefore, if under Daubert the rele-
vant scientific community chosen is incorrect, and this results in an
incorrect determination of general acceptance, the ultimate reliability
of the technique can still be decided correctly due to the flexible five-
part test. The same situation under Frye would result in either the
inclusion of unreliable evidence, or the exclusion of reliable evidence.
This would result in an impairment of the jury's fact-finding role, an
impairment that a court could easily avoid by rejecting Frye.
Even assuming that the proper relevant scientific community can
be identified, the concern over how to prove general acceptance
within that community remains. Courts have utilized three methods
to establish general acceptance: (1) expert testimony, (2) scientific
and legal publications, and (3) judicial opinions.183 Each method has
179. See David L. Faigman et. al., Talker Identification, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW, FORENSIC
SCIENCE ISSUES § 6-1.1 (2002).
180. In relation to talker identification all relevant fields could include: acoustical engineer-
ing, anatomy, electrical engineering, linguistics, phonetics, physics, physiology, psychology, and
statistics. Id. at n.4.
181. Id.
182. See David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., The Scientific Status of DNA Testing,
in SCIENCE IN THE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES § 11-2.7.4 (2002) ("Given the great
diversity of forensic questions to which DNA testing might be applied, it is not possible to
define specific scientific expertises appropriate to each."). The authors go on to state: "Just as
highly focused specialists may be unaware of aspects of an application outside their field of
expertise, so too scientists who have not previously dealt with forensic samples can be unaware
of case-specific factors that can confound the interpretation of test results." Id.
183. Giannelli, supra note 22, at 1215.
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its problems. Expert testimony may be biased, as the expert testifying
may often be the leading proponent of the novel technique. Further,
trial courts must determine how many experts are needed before
general acceptance is proven. The California Supreme Court stated
that "[i]deally, resolution of the general acceptance issue would
require consideration of the views of a typical cross-section of the
scientific community, including representatives, if there are such, of
those who oppose or question the new technique."'184 As if a trial
court's guidance were not vague enough under Frye, California would
now have the trial court determine a "typical cross-section" of the
already difficult to define relevant scientific community. Frye's
search for general acceptance requires neither corroboration nor
impartiality, two factors seemingly indispensable in a search for the
reliability of a scientific technique, making expert testimony as to
general acceptance a suspect method.
Apart from expert testimony, many Frye courts rely upon pub-
lished articles, cases, and treatises as a method of judicial notice. The
problems inherent in this method include a failure to discover all of
the relevant materials and the lag time between general acceptance
(or rejection of a technique previously accepted) and publication. As
the New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
[I]n practice too many courts reference reported case law to deter-
mine what is generally accepted in the scientific community. It is
improper to look for scientific acceptance only from reported case
law because that amounts to finding a consensus in the legal com-
munity based on scientific evidence that is sometimes many years
old.185
As the Supreme Court in Daubert noted, courts should determine
evidentiary reliability based on scientific validity.' 86 By focusing
solely on previous judicial decisions a trial court instead focuses on
judicial validity, a method incapable of independently determining
reliability.17 Be it expert testimony, judicial opinions, or legal and
scientific journals, each method of demonstrating general acceptance
has its flaws. Daubert's flexible approach holds an advantage over
184. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1976).
185. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993).
186. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993); see also supra note
120.
187. A trial may be a search for truth, but its procedures are not set up to determine to the
degree necessary the reliability of a scientific proposition. The scientific process, unlike the
adversary process, is formulated to prove to a certifiable degree the truthfulness of a proposi-
tion.
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Frye's method of demonstrating reliability. By examining more than
just general acceptance, Daubert expands the amount of relevant
information that could prove a technique's reliability. Adherence to
Frye requires devotion to a standard no longer able to properly
ensure the reliability of scientific evidence, and thus possibly impairs
the jury's proper fact-finding role.
Distinct from this method of satisfying Frye's standard is the
measure of support required to prove general acceptance. The term
"general" is by definition vague, making the term "general accep-
tance" virtually useless. Courts have not precisely addressed what
percentage of the relevant community must approve of the technique
or method before it is generally accepted. Unanimity is not required,
and the mere existence of a dispute does not forbid a finding of
general acceptance; otherwise, there is no adequate definition among
the Frye jurisdictions. Illinois courts have used phrases such as
"most" 1s8 and a "majority,"' 189 which afford little more aid than "gen-
eral."'19 Akin to choosing the improper relevant scientific commu-
nity, 91 this provides another example of how the malleability of Frye
might result in the admission of evidence that has not gained approval
by the majority.
The Frye standard requires general acceptance of "the thing
from which the deduction is made."' 92 It remains unsettled what this
requires: general acceptance of the scientific technique or of both the
underlying theory and the scientific technique applying that theory. 93
188. People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ill. 1989) ("testimony is questionable since most
scientists doubt its accuracy.").
189. People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (II. 1996) ("[T]he majority of courts deciding the
issue of the admissibility of evidence on the six-step RFLP process have found such evidence to
be admissible.").
190. In Donaldson, the Illinois Supreme Court summarized its acceptance requirement,
holding that:
Simply stated, general acceptance does not require that the methodology be accepted
by unanimity, consensus, or even a majority of experts. A technique, however, is not
"generally accepted" if it is experimental or of dubious validity. Thus, the Frye rule is
meant to exclude methods new to science that undeservedly create a perception of
certainty when the basis for the evidence or opinion is actually invalid.
Donaldson v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002). What the court meant by
this explanation is questionable, as it attempts to describe the limits of acceptance required not
by quantity but quality.
191. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
192. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
193. Compare Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1180 (Kan. 2000) ("The Frye test
is concerned with whether the expert's opinion is based on a technique that has earned general
acceptance in the expert's scientific field as reliable."), with State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304,
1312 (Wash. 1996). ("The rationale of the Frye standard, which requires general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community, is that expert testimony should be presented to the trier of
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The distinction is the difference between general acceptance of how
the technique works and why the technique works. In order to
understand fully the reliability of a scientific technique, courts should
analyze testimony concerning both how and why it works. This is
because evidence based on faulty methods is as unreliable as evidence
based on faulty reasoning. Frye, however, fails to make a distinction,
thus providing yet another area of disagreement among jurisdictions.
For example, in Illinois the Second and Fourth Districts disagree
concerning exactly what must be generally accepted. The Second
District has held that the procedures applying a generally accepted
theory are not subject to Frye.19 4  The Fourth District disagrees,
holding instead that "both the theory and the techniques or proce-
dures implementing the theory must be generally accepted in the
relevant scientific community."'195 This provides another drawback of
Frye, as disagreement and lack of clarity could result in inconsistency,
or worse, the inclusion of unreliable evidence through a failure to
examine why a technique works.
B. Problems After Application
Apart from the numerous problems encountered in applying the
general acceptance standard are those that arise from its operation.
Most notably are the exclusion of reliable evidence and the inclusion
of unreliable evidence, 196 both of which impact the jury's fact-finding
role. The time lag before a new technique or method can gain
enough support to attain general acceptance unsuitably precludes
reliable evidence. By keeping reliable evidence away from the jury,
Frye fails by not allowing a proper inquiry and determination of the
facts at issue. In Illinois, the admissibility of evidence derived from
the product rule (the final step of DNA profiling) demonstrates the
fact only when the scientific community has accepted the reliability of the underlying princi-
ples.") (citation omitted).
194. See People v. Miles, 577 N.E.2d 477,485 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (echoing and applying the
holding in Lipscomb that procedures applying generally accepted scientific theories are not
subject to Frye); People v. Lipscomb, 574 N.E.2d 1345, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (asserting that
"[any question concerning the specific procedures used by the company or expert goes to the
reliability of the evidence and is properly considered by the jury in determining what weight to
give to this evidence").
195. People v. Dalcollo, 669 N.E.2d 378, 385-86 (I11. App. Ct. 1996) (citations omitted).
196. As the Supreme Court noted in Daubert, the exclusion of reliable evidence will occur
no matter how flexible the approach, and this must be tolerated to an extent. Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). However, the inclusion of unreliable
evidence (or junk science) is not to be tolerated, as this more than any other factor may impair
the jury's fact finding role. It is here that Frye fails most blaringly.
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unnecessary time lag resulting from Frye. The product rule is a
method of forensic DNA analysis that helps to determine the statisti-
cal probability that DNA found at a crime scene matches a defen-
dant's DNA.197 In 1994, the Illinois First District Appellate Court
held that the product rule had not yet gained general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community after reviewing the relevant legal
and scientific authority. 198 Two and a half years later, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that the product rule method qualified as
generally accepted, once again after reviewing the relevant legal and
scientific authority.' 99 During this two and a half year period, the
prohibition against using a reliable DNA profiling statistic harmed
criminal defendants, state's attorneys, and countless others. 200 By
relying on more than simply general acceptance, Daubert succeeds in
avoiding unnecessary time lapses, and therefore affords the jury a
proper opportunity to perform its fact-finding role.
The exclusion of reliable evidence may prevent a jury from fully
fulfilling its role, but the introduction of unreliable expert evidence is
even more harmful, as it may permanently affect parties' rights by a
decision reached contrary to fact.201 Again, there may be a time lag
before testimony, literature, or judicial opinion shows certain evi-
dence to be unreliable, or in other words no longer generally ac-
cepted. For example, in the 1930s courts began admitting evidence
197. See generally David H. Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., The Scientific Status of
DNA Testing, in SCIENCE IN THE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES § 11-2.6.2 (2002), for
discussion of the product rule and it uses.
198. See People v. Watson, 629 N.E.2d 634, 644 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Not only did this
preclude product rule testimony, but evidence that the two samples of DNA matched. The
court held that in order to give meaning to a DNA match it was essential to provide a probabil-
ity assessment, and thus, as the probability assessment was inadmissible so was any fact of a
match. Id.
199. See People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731-32 (Ill. 1996).
200. Not only was the product rule shown to be generally accepted in Illinois and other
states, see cases cited in Miller, id. at 732, but during the time lag in Illinois the Oklahoma
Criminal Appeals Court, utilizing the Daubert standard, held the product rule reliable and
admissible. See Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 333-38 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
201. This could play out in one of two ways. In one situation the jury, parties, and court may
all be unaware of the unreliability of the evidence. Here although the losing party does not feel
wronged, there is still an injustice, as the court may reach a decision that is contrary to what
actually should have happened. In the other situation, one party may be aware of the unreliabil-
ity of the evidence, lose a Frye hearing due to general acceptance, and attempt to persuade the
jury of the unreliability through cross-examination or presentation of contrary evidence. No
matter what evidence the party presents to the jury to challenge the evidence's reliability,
however, the jury heard the testimony, and as the California Supreme Court wisely stated, "[f]ay
jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with
impressive credentials." People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976).
20031
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
based on paraffin tests.202 Law enforcement agencies performed the
test to detect gunshot residue on the hand of a person who had
recently fired a gun.20 3 For nearly thirty years, courts deemed the test
generally accepted; it was not until 1967 that the first comprehensive
study found the test unreliable. 204 Thus, by relying on the incorrect
assumption that general acceptance equates to scientific validity,
courts used an unreliable test to admit faulty evidence and taint the
jury's role, and possibly a criminal defendant's freedom.
C. Daubert Criticisms
The attack on Daubert's standard began with its dissent. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred that Frye did
not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Justices' dissent focused on the "[g]eneral observations" of the
majority, categorizing them as suffering "from the flaw common to
most such observations ... they tend to be not only general, but
vague and abstract. '205 It must be recalled, however, that the majority
stressed the FRE 702 inquiry as a flexible one, and provided the
considerations as a mere guide to the trial court.2°6 A trial court is
free to fashion and utilize any number of factors in order to ensure
the reliability of scientific evidence. Additionally, as the Nebraska
Supreme Court emphasized in adopting the Daubert standard, there
has been substantial development of the Daubert standard in state
and federal courts since its inception.2°7 Furthermore, testing, peer
review and publication, error rate, and controlling standards are not
vague or abstract propositions in which to inquire. Conversely, there
are readily identifiable concrete methods to gauge the scientific
validity of a technique or method. Most importantly, this information
is not subject to the subjectivity of a survey of general acceptance.
The Daubert considerations taken as a whole, unlike a single query
into general acceptance, provide a more accurate window into the
reliability of a proposed technique or method. 208
202. See Giannelli, supra note 22, at 1224-25.
203. See id. at 1224-28 for a more detailed description of the paraffin test.
204. Id. at 1224-25.
205. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 594-95.
207. See Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862, 872-73 (Neb. 2001).
208. The dissent also raised questions concerning Daubert's scope in regard to technical or
other forms of evidence admissible under FRE 702, questions that were answered by Kumho
and Joiner. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
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By placing the gatekeeping function with trial judges, critics have
accused Daubert of unduly burdening trial judges by requiring them
to be amateur scientists. They argue Frye is better suited because it
relies on scientists rather than judges to determine scientific reliabil-
ity. This notion requires three assumptions: first, scientists are the
proper authorities to gauge the scientific validity of a technique or
method; second, general acceptance of a scientific technique or
method equates scientific validity; and third, scientific validity equals
evidentiary reliability. The first assumption is correct, for as well-
educated as a trial judge may be, it is the proper role of a scientist to
gauge scientific validity. The next two assumptions are incorrect.
First, although general acceptance may be proof of the scientific
validity of a technique or method, it is not the only way to prove
validity and is not even a scientifically created method. A court
rather than a scientific journal or association declared general accep-
tance as the measure of scientific validity. Second, the Supreme
Court in Daubert may have noted that evidentiary reliability is based
upon scientific validity, 2°9 but nowhere is it stated that scientific
validity equates evidentiary reliability. It is just as improper for a
scientist to rely on a judge to determine scientific validity as it is for a
judge to rely on a scientist to determine evidentiary reliability.
Rather, it is the proper role of the trial judge to determine the admis-
sibility of evidence, as it is the trial judge that is subject to appellate
review for those rulings. Daubert allows trial judges to perform their
role-to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence based on
scientific validity, grounded in evidentiary reliability.
D. The Solution: Adoption of FRE 702 and/or Daubert
Adopting FRE 702210 and/or Daubert can provide structure and
guidance to an area of Illinois law that its courts have sparsely de-
fined, and that is at times confusing.2 11 Since 1923, Illinois courts have
209. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9.
210. Many jurisdictions utilize FRE 702 as their standard for the admission of expert
testimony without adhering to Daubert's considerations. See, e.g., supra note 112.
211. The Supreme Court of Nebraska put it well, stating that:
Given the number of jurisdictions that have adopted the Daubert standards and the
extensive development of the Daubert standards in the state and federal courts, it can
no longer be said that the nature and implications of Daubert are unknown. In fact, to
the extent that this consideration is still relevant, it militates in favor of adopting the
Daubert standards, as Nebraska courts risk losing the benefit of helpful and persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions on newly presented evidentiary issues by their con-
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cited Frye only seventy times, compared with 673 times in highest
courts of every other jurisdiction.2 12 In its short nine-year history, the
highest courts in every jurisdiction have cited Daubert 403 times, and
the Seventh Circuit alone has done so ninety-nine times.213 The
number of Frye jurisdictions is slowly yet assuredly dwindling, a fact
which Illinois must take note of. The Fourth District Appellate Court
in Cropmate signaled the beginning of Daubert's infusion into Illinois
law.2 14 Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court did not see it that
way, and overruled the "Frye plus reliability" standard. 215 In doing so,
however, the court declared that a determination of reliability is
"subsumed" by an inquiry into general acceptance and, most
astonishingly, that "a principle or technique is not generally accepted
in the scientific community if it is by nature unreliable. '' 216 The
history of the paraffin test instructs otherwise.217  Further, it is a
mistake to infer scientific validity from a judicially created standard
that demonstrates nothing more than general acceptance among the
relevant scientific community. In short, Frye cannot ensure reliability
because it does not test for reliability; it simply asks whether a
technique or method is generally accepted. In order to protect the
judicial process, "the focus should not be solely on whether the
scientific technique has gained general acceptance within its
particular field. Rather, it should be on the validity and the
soundness of the scientific method used to generate the evidence.
'218
Therefore, Illinois courts must replace Frye with a standard that can
tinued reliance on a test that is being increasingly removed from the jurisprudential
mainstream.
Schafersman, 631 N.W.2d at 873 (citation omitted).
212. It is safe to assume that simple citation of Frye does not include, in every instance,
analysis, examination, or discussion of the general acceptance standard. The figures for Illinois
and the Seventh Circuit include only published opinions. Supra, note 128. The figure for the
highest courts in every jurisdiction includes all cases.
213. Information based on a Westlaw search of Frye and Daubert on April 13, 2003.
Daubert has been cited, as of April 13, 2003: eight times in the Supreme court, forty-two times in
the First Circuit, twenty-six times in the Second Circuit, thirty-three times in the Third Circuit,
twenty-four times in the Fourth circuit, sixty-two times in the Fifth Circuit, forty-six times in the
Sixth circuit, ninety times in the Eighth circuit, eighty-one times in the Ninth circuit, fifty-one
times in the Tenth circuit, twenty-four times in the Eleventh Circuit, ten times in the D.C.
Circuit, and twenty-one times in the Federal Circuit. These numbers include only published
cases and do not include cases that mention Daubert, but do not actually cite thereto.
214. See Harris v. Cropmate, 706 N.E.2d 55, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), overruled by Donaldson
v. Cent. I11. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314 (I11. 2002).
215. See Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 314; supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
216. Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 326. (citation omitted)
217. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
218. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993).
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with a standard that can ensure reliability through a genuine inquiry
into scientific validity: FRE 702 and/or Daubert.
The United States Supreme Court emphasized the flexible, lib-
eral thrust of FRE 702 on the way to formulating the Daubert stan-
dard.2 9 Should Illinois adopt FRE 702, it would not be the first time
the state has judicially adopted an evidentiary rule intended to
liberalize trial procedures. In 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted FRE 703, in line with the "modern trend liberalizing certain
trial procedures. '220  FRE 703 states that an expert may give an
opinion or inference based on facts or data not admissible in evidence
if the facts or data are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject. '' 221 Further, the Rule provides that "[f]acts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury.., unless the
court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial
effect. '222 Therefore, according to FRE 703, an expert may presuma-
bly give an opinion based on a scientific technique or theory that
experts in their field reasonably rely upon, regardless of whether the
scientific technique meets the more stringent standard of general
acceptance.123 Apart from the internal conflict presented between
219. See supra text accompanying note 36.
220. Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (I11. 981). The court also adopted FRE 705. Id.
221. FED. R. EVID. 703.
222. Id. Additionally, although the underlying facts or data are not admitted for their
truthfulness (they may be admitted for the limited purpose of explaining the expert's opinion),
the expert's opinion is admitted as substantive evidence. Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court
has held that it can be reversible error not to allow the expert to disclose to the jury inadmissible
hearsay they relied upon if the jury is left to believe the expert has no reasonable basis for their
opinion. See People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. 1986); see generally CORKERY, supra note
150, § 703.000.
223. In choosing whether to apply Frye, many states draw a distinction between an expert's
opinion based on their own experience, observation and study, and an opinion based on novel
scientific principles presented by others. Only in the latter example would the testimony be
subject to Frye. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1181 (Kan. 2000);
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 123 (Ariz. 2000). The Logerquist court explained this
distinction as follows:
Frye is applicable when an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction from the
application of novel scientific principles, formulae, or procedures developed by others.
It is inapplicable when a witness reaches a conclusion by inductive reasoning based on
his or her own experience []. In the latter case, the validity of the premise is tested by
interrogation of the witness; in the former case, it is tested by inquiring into general
acceptance.
Id. at 133; see also Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828 (asserting that "pure opinion testimony, such as
an expert's opinion that a defendant is incompetent, does not have to meet Frye, because this
type of testimony is based on the expert's personal experience and training"). The results of
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FRE 703 and the intentions of Frye224 is the lesson-Illinois has
already recognized the flexible trial procedures embodied in FRE 702
and Daubert through its adoption of FRE 703.221
CONCLUSION
The presence of scientific and technical evidence at trial has in-
creased markedly over the last thirty years, as it will no doubt long
into the future. Coupled with this increase has been the speed at
which new technology becomes old and obsolete. In order to keep up
with the advances made in the laboratory, and to allow the jury to
perform its proper fact-finding role, courts must arm themselves with
a standard capable of evolving with the times. Frye is incapable of
this. The rigid general acceptance standard admits unreliable evi-
dence and excludes reliable evidence. It creates an impermissible
time lag between the discovery of a reliable technique or method and
its admissibility. Frye's factors and boundaries are hard to define, and
have long been the subject of widespread criticism. These reasons,
among others, have led thirty-seven jurisdictions to modify or aban-
don Frye's general acceptance standard. Illinois should follow suit,
abandoning the general acceptance standard in favor the more
flexible FRE 702 and/or Daubert-based approaches capable of
evolving with the times. In one final application, Illinois should find
that Frye is no longer generally accepted and finally lay it to rest.
this distinction are illogical, as the jury could be tainted by junk science just because the expert
presenting it was the one who thought of it.
224. The Alaska Supreme Court recognized this conflict, stating that "our decisions in
Contreras [incorrectly assuming that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not change the Frye
test] ignored Alaska Rule of Evidence 703, which employs a 'reasonably relied upon by experts'
standard in contrast to Frye's 'general acceptance' standard." State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394
(Alaska 1999). Additionally, the court based its adoption of Daubert not on its version of FRE
702, but rather its version and comments to FRE 703. Thus, even if Illinois were not to adopt
FRE 702, it could already have enough of a basis to adopt Daubert based in FRE 703.
225. The Illinois Supreme Court took notice in Wilson v. Clark of the number of other states
that had already adopted FRE 703 and FRE 705, those being eighteen and seventeen states
respectively. Clark, 417 N.E.2d at 1327. The court should likewise take note of the forty-five
states that have adopted a version of Rule 702. See infra tbl. 2.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1.
JURISDICTION'S STANCE ON THE ADMISSION OF NOVEL
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
FRE 702 STANDARD
ILLUSTRATIVE HIGH OR FOR
JURISDICTION COURT DECISION SIMILAR ADMISSION
226
S. Energy Homes, Inc. v.
Washington, 774 So. 2d 505
(Ala. 2000); Ex parte Perry,
Alabama 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991) Yes MF
State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386
Alaska (Alaska 1999) Yes D
Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d
Arizona 113 (Ariz. 2000) Yes F
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.e Co.
of Ark., Inc. v. Foote, 14
Arkansas S.W.3d 512 (Ark. 2000) Yes D
People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d
321 (Cal. 1994); People v.
Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal.
California 1979) No227  F
People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68
Colorado (Colo. 2001) Yes R
228
State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739
Connecticut (Conn. 1997) Yes D
M.G. Bancorporation, Inc.
v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513
Delaware (Del. 1999) Yes D
Nixon v. U.S., 728 A.2d 582
D.C. (D.C. 1999) No F
226. Standard for the admission of novel scientific evidence. CL: common law jurisdiction;
D: Daubert jurisdiction; F: Frye jurisdiction; MF: modified Frye jurisdiction; R: rule based
jurisdiction; R/D: rule based jurisdiction which utilizes, without adopting, Daubert criteria.
227. But see People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 327-28 (Cal. 1994) (stating that California
Evidence Code sections 720 and 801 are the "functional equivalent" of FRE 702).
228. Although Colorado has not adopted Daubert, the state acknowledged Daubert's




Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d
836 (Fla. 2001) -Yc
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Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d
Georgia 389 (Ga. 1982) No CL
229
State v. Fukusaka, 946 P.2d
Hawaii 32 (Haw. 1997) Yes R
Walker v. American Cy-
anamid Co., 948 P.2d 1123
(Idaho 1997); State v.
Gleason, 844 P.2d 691
Idaho (Idaho 1992) Yes R
Donaldson v. Ill. Pub. Serv.
Co., 767 N.E.2d 314 (I11.
2002); People v. Miller, 670
Illinois N.E.2d 721 (I11. 1996) No F
Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453
Indiana (Ind. 2001) Yes R
Leaf v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525
Iowa (Iowa 1999) Yes R
Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm.
Co., 14 P.3d 1170 (Kan.
Kansas 2000) No F
Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d
Kentucky 575 (Ky. 2000) Yes D
Blank v. Sid Richardson
Carbon & Gasoline Co., 762
So. 2d 1115 (La. 2000); State
v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116
Louisiana (La. 1993) Yes D
State v. Tomah, 736 A.2d
1047 (Me. 1999); State v.
Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me.
Maine 1978) Yes R
229. The state's test requires the court to ask whether the procedure or technique in
question has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty. Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389,
395 (Ga. 1982).
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Maryland
Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65
(Md. 1999); Reed v. State,
391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Lanigan,
641 N.E.2d 1342 (Mass.
Massachusetts 1994) Yes D
People v. Peterson, 537
Michigan N.W.2d 857 (Mich. 1995) Yes F
Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615
Minnesota N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 2000) Yes MF
Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d
Mississippi 1083 (Miss. 1998) Yes F
Callahan v. Cardinal
Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d
Missouri 852 (Mo. 1993) Yes F
Gilkey v. Schweitzer, 983
Montana P.2d 869 (Mont. 1999) Yes D
Schafersman v. Agland
Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862
Nebraska (Neb. 2001) Yes D
Yahama Motor Co., U.S.A.
v. Arnoult, 955 P.2d 661
(Nev. 1998); Townsend v.
State, 734 P.2d 705 (Nev.
Nevada 1987) Yes R
State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260
New Hampshire (N.H. 2000) Yes F
State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d
596 (N.J. 1997); Rubanick v.
Witco Chem. Corp., 593
A.2d 733,747 (N.J. 1991)
New Jersey (toxic tort exception) Yes MF
State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d
New Mexico 192 (N.M. 1993) Yes R
New York People v. Wernick, 674
N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1996)230 No F
230. But see Clemente v. Blumenberg, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1999); Wahl v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 693 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
2003]
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State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d
631 (N.C. 1995) Ye
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Meyer v. Rygg, 630 N.W.2d
North Dakota 62 (N.D. 2001) Yes R
Miller v. Bike Athletic Co.,
Ohio 687 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio 1998) Yes R
Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319
Oklahoma (Ok. Crim. App. 1995)211 Yes D
State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663
Oregon (Or. 1995) Yes D
Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d
Pennsylvania 1 (Pa. 2000) Yes F
Raimbeault v. Takeuchi
Mfg. (U.S.), Ltd., 772 A.2d
Rhode Island 1056 (R.I. 2001) Yes D
State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d
South Carolina 508 (S.C. 1999) Yes R
State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d
South Dakota 482 (S.D. 1994) Yes D
McDaniel v. CSZ Transp.,
Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn.
Tennessee 1997) Yes R
232
E.I. Du Pont Nemours and
Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923
Texas S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) Yes D
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638
Utah (Utah 1996) Yes CL
233
State v. Streich, 658 A.2d 38
Vermont (Vt. 1995) Yes D
Spencer v. Commonwealth,
Virginia 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va. 1990) Yes R
Medcalf v. Dept. of Licens-
Washington ing, 944 P.2d 1014 (Wash. Yes F
231. There is no illustrative state supreme court decision on point.
232. "Although we do not expressly adopt Daubert, the non-exclusive list of factors to
determine reliability are useful in applying our Rules 702 and 703." McDaniel v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257,265 (Tenn. 1997).
233. The jurisdiction uses an "inherent reliability" test. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 640
(Utah 1996).
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1997); State v. Copeland, 922
P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996)
Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d
West Virginia 196 (W. Va. 1993) Yes D
State v. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d
Wisconsin 469 (Wis. 1984) Yes R
Bunting v. Jamieson, 984
Wyoming P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999) Yes D
TABLE 2.
JURISDICTIONAL ADOPTION OF FRE 702
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE NOT
ADOPTED FRE 702 OR SIMILAR ADOPTED FRE 702 OR SIMILAR
(45) (6)
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecti- Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, New
cut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, York





New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, South
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TABLE 3.
RULE 702 JURISDICTIONS AND THE FRYE HYDRA
FRE 702 FRE 702 FRE 702
JURISDICTIONS THAT JURISDICTIONS THAT JURISDICTIONS THAT
UTILIZE FRYE (8) MODIFY FRYE (4) REJECT FRYE (33)
Arizona, Florida, Alabama, Minnesota, Alaska, Arkansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey Colorado, Connecti-
Mississippi, New cut, Delaware,
Hampshire, Pennsyl- Hawaii, Idaho,

















NON-RULE 702 JURISDICTIONS AND THE FRYE HYDRA
NON-FRE 702 JURISDICTIONS NON-FRE 702 JURISDICTIONS
THAT UTILIZE FRYE (5) THAT REJECT FRYE (1)
California, District of Columbia, Georgia
Illinois, Kansas, New York
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